However, Libya is currently facing turbulence due to both the political stalemate regarding the non-consensus on the political agreement on Libya[1] and security intervals that have culminated in instability and terrorist attacks or threats; economic distress, power cuts and the acute currency crisis. In fact, there are currently three rival governments. This agreement between the EU and Libya was, however, signed with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). It is therefore mysterious why the EU is going to strike a deal with such a Bedlam country. The agreement could therefore be a reactive response to the demand of many European citizens to their respective governments to control migration. Among these concerns is the emergence of far-right political tendencies rather than a German plan to tackle the problem of migration along the Mediterranean (Bremmer, 2015). [3] ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20170125_migration_on_the_central_mediterranean_route_-_managing_flows_saving_lives_en.pdf The arbitrariness and indefinite duration of Libya`s immigration detention system means that there are only discretionary, informal and often dangerous or exploited ways for people to leave. Indeed, the general policy of cooperation with the Libyan authorities in the field of border controls and border management has been designed and implemented in a coherent manner at EU level. It began with the launch in 2013 of the EU Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM) with the aim of helping the Libyan authorities improve and develop the security of the country`s borders. [1] It continued with the modification of the mandate of the naval operation EunavforMed Sophia, responsible for training members of the Libyan Coast Guard since June 2016[2]. It was broadened by the Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs of 25 January 2017, which identified measures to strengthen the capabilities of the Libyan Coast Guard as one of the main priorities. [3] The strategy was complemented by the Malta Declaration[4] of 3 February 2017, which explicitly cited as a top priority “training, equipment and assistance to the Libyan National Coast Guard and other relevant agencies”.
It is essential that this Declaration also reaffirms the intention to strengthen the integration of migration into the EU`s official development assistance to Africa, including by mobilising resources under the EU Emergency Assistance Fund for Stability and Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa (EUTFA). Critics say European support for such eavesdropping and feedback is one of the most egregious examples of the trade-off between respect for human rights – a core EU value – and the EU`s determination to reduce migration to the continent. “As soon as the EU has concluded formal agreements with third countries. It is more closely linked to many human rights and refugee obligations,” Raphael Bossong, a researcher at the SWP in Berlin, told TNH. “That`s why we`re seeing a shift towards less binding or purely informal agreements.” Neither the complexity of international migration, nor the countless challenges Libya faces today, excuse the brutality that is taking place in Libya towards migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.
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